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Chapter 3
Implications for Long-term Investors of the  
Shifting Distribution of Capital Market 
Returns
James Moore and Niels Pedersen
It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.
(attributed to Yogi Berra)
Despite the caution from Hall of  Fame baseball player cum philosopher Mr. Berra, 
few people have stopped trying to predict the future. And nowhere is prediction more 
common than in the financial markets. One cannot watch financial television for more 
than an hour without a guest being asked where he believes the level of  the S&P 500, 
an individual stock, the price of  gold, or the ten-year Treasury yield will be at year-end. 
Given the vagaries of  the market, short-term forecasting, particularly for high volatil-
ity assets, is little more than a toss of  the dice. The media soon forget the many whose 
predictions are off the mark. The few whose prognostications end up close to the mark 
are ascribed sage-like properties and develop cults of  followers. While short-run fore-
casting has value for financial entertainment and speculation, in the United States and 
much of  the developed world, there is perhaps no field where long-run forecasting has 
wider implications for personal welfare than that of  forecasting asset returns.
The expected returns of  stocks, bonds, and other investments play a critical role 
in retirement planning, budgeting, and determining future savings adequacy. Of  
course, practitioners in the space—plan sponsors, investment advisors, consultants, 
asset managers, and others versed in statistics—know that future returns are ran-
dom variables. Actual returns through time are drawn from a distribution of  pos-
sibilities. Given this fact, outcomes that are functions of  the realized returns are 
themselves distributions of  random variables. The specific form of  the ultimate 
distribution in question relies on (a) the stochastic processes governing the returns 
themselves, (b) the functional form that these returns are ‘filtered’ through, and 
possibly (c) convolutions of  multiple functional forms. Even when the underlying 
stochastic processes are known with certainty and the generating distributions are 
well behaved, the transforming nature of  the real-world functions overlaid can lead 
to significant alterations of  the resultant distributions. In some cases this may com-
press distributions; in others it may lead to tails that are exaggerated.
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Yet it is important to remember that we do not know the true statistical generating process 
of  asset returns. The vast majority of  work done by practitioners relies on the lessons 
learned in undergraduate statistics courses. The insights absorbed there rely heav-
ily on the Law of  Large Numbers and asymptotic convergence to normality. These 
in turn rely on the stronger assumptions of  stationarity and ergodicity. What if  
these do not hold?
To explore this question, this chapter looks at the implications of  long horizon 
asset returns that flow from three different generating processes for stock and bond 
returns.1 The first, a multivariate normal distribution, is widely used due to its 
familiarity and analytic tractability and has been used for Monte Carlo statistical 
analyses since the Second World War. The second, a block bootstrap approach, 
has become more common in the past few decades with increases in computing 
power and questions as to the appropriateness of  normality given limited histori-
cal data. The third approach uses a nested structural model that links asset returns 
to macroeconomic fluctuations in the real economy. The core of  this model relies 
on a non-stationary, Markov-switching evolution of  real GDP as first modeled by 
Hamilton (1994).
Each of  these approaches has different pros and cons. The first approach 
is easy to implement. The second makes heavy use of  actual historical prec-
edence and can capture short-intermediate-horizon autocorrelation and 
cross-correlation structures. The third allows for the strongest linkage between 
economic theory and simulation results, dynamic correlation behavior, and dif-
ferential, conditional sub-period dynamics. But this comes with additional com-
plexity in model design and calibration difficulty. In what follows we explore the 
differences in model outcomes focusing on the behavior of  distribution tails and 
the implications for potentially differing intra-path dynamics. This may have 
great importance for pensions. For defined benefit (DB) plans, this can meaning-
fully impact the magnitude and timing of  required contributions. For defined 
contribution (DC) plans, it can have meaningful welfare implications—especially 
if  there are behavioral responses to participant asset allocations around extreme 
performance periods.
Preliminaries
Before we elaborate on model differences, it is worth spending some time looking 
at the nature of  uncertainty about the first moments of  our return distributions. In 
Figure 3.1, we see three different averages of  historic real equity returns—rolling 
ten- and 30-year geometric average returns, as well as the full sample geometric 
average.2 Both rolling averages display quite a bit of  variation. The ten-year num-
bers range from a low of  −4.3 percent to a high of  17.9 percent. The 30-year num-
bers range from 3.1 percent to 9.9 percent and have deviated above or below the 
full sample average of  6.5 percent for periods as long as 19 years.3
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Standard theory would instruct us to ‘use all the data.’ Yet while this may work 
for a return series as long-lived and as widely followed as the S&P 500, note that 
even here, the standard error of  the estimate is 1.55 percent. If  the meandering 
of  the rolling averages gives us reason to question stationarity, the standard error 
could be still wider than that. For other return series—foreign markets or new asset 
classes—30 years of  reliable data may be difficult to obtain. Dimson et al. (2002) 
contains a nice discussion of  additional problems due to censoring, survivorship 
bias, market discontinuities, and other factors that plague offshore equity markets, 
even for developed economies.
The economic impact of  such volatility on savers can be tremendous. Taking 
the extremes of  our 30-year rolling averages for illustration, imagine a 35-year-old 
putting a dollar of  her 401(k) in the S&P for a planned age-65 retirement. If  she 
assumes her dollar saved will grow at a conservative 3.1 percent per annum, it will be 
worth 2.5 times as much in real dollars. At a more robust 9.9 percent, that dollar 
would grow to $17.
It should be noted that a 30-year horizon is frequently cited in corporate and 
public sector DB plans to justify future expected return assumptions that would 
imply implausibly large forward-looking equity return spreads over available 
risk-free debt of  long maturities.4 Despite the market crashes of  2000–2002 
and 2008–2009, the most recent 30-year real equity returns exceeded the very 
10-yr geo avg 30-yr geo avg Full Sample
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Figure 3.1. Averages of  S&P Composite real returns, 1871–2012.
Note: 1871–2010 data from Shiller (2013); 2010+ from Bloomberg (2013).
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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long-term average by 2.0 percent per annum. This is due to the power of  the bull run 
of  the 1980s and 1990s. The 30-year horizon also conveniently leaves out the poor 
returns in the 1970s. A similar story holds for bonds.
The focus on equity alone raises to some degree the question about expected 
bond returns and the interplay between expected equity returns and bond returns. 
A serious analysis of  returns should not explore the return dynamics of  stocks in 
isolation. It should also analyze other investment choices and account for relevant 
conditioning variables. Bonds play a role in both cases. The body of  literature on 
expected returns is large and growing (see Ilmanen 2011). A key implication of  the 
literature is that expected returns vary over time. Factors such as interest rates, the 
spread between high yield and investment-grade debt, aggregate dividend yields 
and earnings yields, and book-to-market ratios, for instance, all have some predic-
tive power in forecasting stock returns. More recently, longer-term factors such as 
demographic variables have been shown by Arnott and Chavez (2012), among oth-
ers, to have some explanatory value.
In addition to uncertainty as to the ex ante mean, there is some uncertainty 
regarding the long-run generating process and how uncertainty compounds over 
time. There appears to be different behavior in the short run and the long run. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) used variance ratios to demonstrate that returns show 
positive serial correlation (momentum) over short horizons. Moreover, Poterba and 
Summers (1988), Campbell and Viciera (2005), and others have demonstrated that 
in long horizons there appears to be some evidence of  mean reversion.
But even with conditioning variables, the specification of  the ex ante mean 
expected return is an imprecise exercise. If  that is the case, how much faith can 
we have in characterization of  higher moments or distribution tails? In what fol-
lows, we first discuss the slow nature of  convergence of  financial variables to a true 
mean, even if  one assumes stationarity. Next we lay out our three different simula-
tion approaches. A macroeconomic regime-switching model is introduced as a 
mechanism to be able to capture both shorter-term and longer-term behavior of  
financial markets. We then describe the two real-world filtrations of  interest: (a) a 
long-term glide path for a defined contribution plan, and (b) the funding and con-
tribution impact over a more moderately long horizon for a corporate DB plan. 
After a summary of  the results, we compare the dynamics for the three model 
approaches.
Slow Convergence to a True Mean
Uncertainty about the true mean or expected return is quantitatively large, even 
if  we assume that the annual stock return can be viewed as a realization from a 
stationary distribution. The solid dark lines in Figure 3.2 show the 95 percent 
confidence interval for the expected excess stock return based on a 16 percent 
annual volatility and a sample average of  7 percent. The figure reminds us of  the 
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unnerving statistical uncertainties associated with some of  the key parameters that 
most simulation techniques take as given.
Of  course, if  the true process is not stationary, convergence can be even slower 
still. Figure 3.2 also shows the convergence in estimation for another process with 
true mean of  7 percent and volatility of  16 percent. In this case, the generating 
process is a Markov-switching mixture of  normal distributions where the two 
sub-sample means are set at a level ±3.5 percent around our true mean (i.e. 3.5 per-
cent and 10.5 percent). The parameters are chosen to correspond approximately to 
the widest deviations of  the 30-year rolling averages from the full sample mean in 
the Shiller dataset (2013) shown previously.
A total of  10,000 150-year paths were run with starting draws equally split 
between the high and low conditional mean return states. State transitions 
occurred according to a two-state Markov chain set with p = q so that each state is 
equally probable over the course of  the simulation and the distribution of  returns 
is symmetric.5 Values of  p and q are set at 0.90 (dashed line) and 0.95 (dotted line) 
corresponding to average durations of  the conditional states of  ten and 20 years. 
Bootstrap standard errors are calculated from the 10,000 simulation trails to con-
struct confidence intervals.
We see that this generates consistently wider confidence intervals. At the 30-year 
sample point, the ten-year average regime duration process would yield a confi-
dence interval with a 1.93  percent wider spread (3.32  percent for the 20-year 
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Figure 3.2. Slow convergence to true mean.
Note: 1871–2010 data from Shiller (2013); 2010+ from Bloomberg (2013).
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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average duration process). Convergence is also slower: comparing the ratio of  the 
confidence intervals as the sample increases, at 30 years, the 20-year, slow switch 
process is 29 percent wider than our baseline case; at 150 years it is 36 percent 
wider.
Three Different Return-generating Models and 
Their Results
We compare three different return-generating models—a multivariate normal 
distribution model, a block bootstrap model which resamples from past histori-
cal data, and a third structural model that is designed and calibrated to capture a 
number of  economic features. The more involved macroeconomic long horizon 
simulation model is described in some detail below, with a more detailed technical 
appendix at the end of  the chapter. The other two models, multivariate normal and 
block bootstrap, are commonly used by both academics and practitioners and are 
presented later as counterparts for comparison and evaluation of  the more expan-
sive macroeconomic approach. Limitations of  both of  these models provided the 
impetus for the development of  this modeling approach.
Macroeconomic Long Horizon Simulation (LHS) 
Model
The premise of  the macro-driven long horizon simulation model is that the dynamic 
processes for macroeconomic growth, inflation, and risk aversion jointly determine 
both the short-term dynamics as well as the variations in discount factors applied 
to these cash flows in financial markets to form asset prices and valuations for both 
risk-free and risky investments. When we impose restrictions and assumptions on 
the dynamics of  these fundamental variables that are based on theory and aca-
demic research, we indirectly imply a set of  ‘structural’ restrictions for the long-term 
valuations of  asset prices, such as bond prices and equity prices, which restrict the 
plausible range of  average investment returns and volatility over a given investment 
horizon. Cochrane (2011) contains a discussion of  some these issues.
The secular dynamics of  productivity growth or ‘potential’ GDP growth, infla-
tion rates, and equilibrium risk premiums shape the distributions of  real interest 
rates and nominal interest rates and equity yields (dividends and earnings yields) 
over a long-term investment horizon. Similarly, the business cycle dynamics of  
unemployment, output gap, and central bank policy, as well as the accompany-
ing temporary bouts of  extreme uncertainty and risk aversion in financial markets, 
shape the distribution of  asset returns and yield curves in the short term.
A structural macroeconomic regime-switching (LHS) model combines these 
guiding principles and ideas within a unified structural framework designed to 
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remain highly empirically and quantitatively relevant. Figure 3.3 summarizes the 
structure of  the model at a high level.
This LHS model explicitly incorporates the main dynamic linkages between 
economic growth and inflation, monetary policy, risk aversion, and realized 
asset returns. In this way it provides a suitable framework for assessment of  both 
long-term and short-term distributions of  asset returns and yields curves. The 
framework allows us to quantify both the short-term and long-term tail risks that 
strategic long-term investors face based on inputs for the main drivers of  returns 
(long-term growth, long-term inflation, and equity risk premium) and allows us to 
explore the impact of  parameter uncertainty.
A key feature of  the model is the regime-switching component, which gener-
ates realistic business cycle dynamics in the model (see Hamilton 1989). The 
regime-switching dynamics directly translate into realistic cyclical fluctuations in 
inflation, GDP growth, and risk premiums. They also enable the model to more 
closely match the higher frequency moments of  asset returns distributions, as well 
as the general correlations with macro variables over the business cycle. More spe-
cifically, such regime-switching models can produce the type of  rapid changes in 
risk premiums required to generate the ‘boom–bust’ characteristics of  asset returns 
experienced historically. The regime-switching behavior ultimately also generates 
a strong tendency for mean reversion in average returns, and it reduces volatility of  
those returns over long-term investment horizons. A more detailed description of  
each component of  the model is provided next.
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Macro Regimes
The business cycle dynamics are determined by a regime-switching model that 
places the macro economy in either a ‘contraction’ or an ‘expansion,’ similar to the 
specification first introduced by Hamilton (1989). One extension is that the transi-
tions between these two regimes are governed by time-varying probabilities mod-
eled with duration-dependent hazard functions. The duration dependence is such 
that the hazard rate increases exponentially with the time the economy has been in 
a specific regime. The probability that a specific recession or expansion comes to an 
end consequently increases with the duration of  the current stage of  the business 
cycle. The parameters of  the hazard function for contractions and expansion are 
calibrated to match the characteristics of  National Bureau of  Economic Research 
(NBER) business cycle durations, both in terms of  their average length and their 
standard deviation. Since contractions tend to be shorter-lived than expansions, 
the transition probabilities are inherently asymmetric.
Real Activity, Growth, and Output Gaps
The business cycle dynamics of  real GDP growth are derived from the specifica-
tion of  a dynamic process for the output gap. In a recession, the output gap con-
verges to a negative level, whereas it converges to a positive level in an expansion. 
The specification that is used within regimes ensures that real GDP growth rate 
is generally most negative at the beginning of  a recession and most positive at the 
beginning of  an expansion. Overall the parameters are calibrated to match the dis-
tribution of  real GDP growth and the distribution of  output gap realizations within 
both expansions and contractions. The long-term potential GDP growth is set to 
an exogenous rate in the model, which can reflect forward-looking views on pro-
ductivity growth or simply the historical growth rate of  about 2 percent per year. In 
principle the long-run growth rate can have its own dynamics.
Inflation
Inflation in the model has both a cyclical business cycle-driven component and 
a persistent, long-term component. The business cycle component of  inflation is 
assumed to be driven by cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand and, as such, it 
is based on the simulated level of  the output gap. A positive output gap is associ-
ated with high cyclical levels of  inflation, whereas a large negative output gap will 
reduce the inflation rate to a level below the long-term ‘structural’ inflation rate 
that is prevailing at a given point in time. This feature of  the model resembles the 
well-known ‘Phillips’ curve from theoretical economic models. The long-run level 
of  realized inflation, and hence also the long-run level of  inflation expectations, is 
determined by shocks to a stationary but highly persistent process for non-business 
cycle-related inflation fluctuations. Shocks to this process have a very significant 
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impact on the expected inflation rates many years into the future, which are impor-
tant in shaping the long-term distribution of  nominal yields.
Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to respond to the cyclical components of  inflation 
and real activity. The response function is calibrated with a Taylor rule that implies 
positive real rate responses to both the cyclical component of  inflation and the out-
put gap. Both effects will tend to push the Federal Reserve to reduce short-term 
real rates in recessions (absent any short-term supply shocks to inflation) and 
increase the short-term real rate in expansions. The current unusual monetary 
policy stance, however, warrants an explicit adjustment to this general description 
of  monetary policy. The impact of  quantitative easing (QE) is therefore explicitly 
modeled. Specifically, for the two years until the end of  2014, our model assigns 
only a small probability that the Fed exits its current stance (with a fixed fed funds 
rate at 25 basis points) and raises the fed funds rate toward the level implied by 
the Taylor rule. After that, it is assumed that the probability of  exiting the regime 
increases over time.
Yield Curve and Bond Returns
The nominal yield curve is derived as the expected future short rate plus an infla-
tion risk term premium and a real rate risk term premium. The ‘expectations 
component’ of  the yield curve is implicitly derived from the expected dynamics 
of  the output gap and inflation because they ‘pass through’ the Taylor rule to the 
expected future fed funds rate. As a consequence, the expectations component of  
the yield curve responds to the current state of  the business cycle and becomes 
logically consistent with the specified dynamics for monetary policy, inflation, and 
real activity. The business cycle dynamics of  short maturity yields are dominated 
by business cycle-driven fluctuations in expectations about monetary policy, which 
creates interesting and very realistic endogenous dynamics in the yield curve simu-
lations. For instance, at the beginning of  an expansion the market will price addi-
tional rate increases resulting in a steepening yield curve, whereas at the beginning 
of  a recession the market will anticipate further easing of  monetary policy over the 
course of  the recession and yield curves will potentially be inverted for some time 
as the economy enters a contraction. Overall, the yield curve will be ‘steepest’ in 
the middle of  or at the end of  a recession, whereas the curve will be ‘flattest’ in the 
middle of  an expansion. The current shape of  the yield curve is consistent with our 
modeling of  QE.
The cyclical dynamics of  long maturity yields in the model are, on the other 
hand, mostly driven by fluctuations in inflation and real rate risk premiums, since 
long-term expectations for real rates and inflation (and hence expectations for 
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distant future policy rates) are fairly stable across the business cycle. This is consist-
ent with empirical evidence suggesting that survey-based measures of  long-term 
expectations and real activity are quite constant over time and simply do not fluctu-
ate enough to generate the observed volatility in long-term real and nominal yields 
at annual frequencies.
While risk premiums fluctuate in the short run and drive dynamics in the short 
run for long maturity yields, they remain fairly constant and are ‘bounded’ in the 
long run. The main driver of  any significant dispersion in the simulated long-run 
dispersion of  nominal yields is therefore gradual accumulation of  small but per-
sistent shocks to inflation. Generally speaking, significant changes in long-term 
interest rate changes must be accompanied by persistent changes in the level of  
inflation.
Finally, we note that, on average, long maturity bonds have higher expected 
returns due to the maturity-dependent term premium that is specified in the model. 
As a result of  this risk premium, the average yield curve tends to be upward slop-
ing at maturities out to about 20–25 years. After that convexity, effects in the yield 
curve flattens the curve and cause even longer-term yields to decline gradually with 
maturity.
Equity Returns
Equity prices are based on expected dividends discounted with the term struc-
ture of  risk-free yields as well as the equity risk premium. The equity return 
is composed of  dividend yields plus capital appreciation (re-pricing of  equi-
ties). Earnings growth is based on future GDP growth and mean reversion in 
corporate profit margins. We assume a constant payout ratio for dividends. 
Consequently, short-term earnings growth expectations will rationally fall when 
the probability of  entering a recession increases in the model, but long-term 
earnings growth and dividend growth expectations do not fluctuate a lot over 
time. The dominant component of  equity returns and return volatility is the 
‘re-pricing’ component of  returns and the associated changes in the price to 
‘stabilized’ earnings ratio. The dynamics of  the P/E ratio are inherently linked 
to the behavior of  both long-term real rates and, especially, the dynamics of  the 
equity risk premium. The re-pricing return in a given period is approximately 
equal to the change in the equity discount factor times the equity price dura-
tion with respect to yield and equity risk premium changes. The equity price 
duration can be inferred from the discounted cash flow model but will be about 
20–30 years depending on current valuations. In the recessionary regime, equity 
risk premiums will tend to widen (capital loss) with higher volatility, but will 
narrow (capital gain) in an expansion. Similarly, the volatility of  risk aversion 
levels and hence equity premiums are assumed to be higher in recessions than 
expansions.
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To summarize, most of  the annual volatility in equity returns is due to the fluc-
tuations in the discount rate and hence fluctuations of  the equity risk premium and 
long-term interest rates. The volatility is not due to shocks to expected future cash 
flows. These features are consistent with the extensive body of  academic research 
associated with Robert Shiller.
Comparison to Alternative Simulation 
Approaches
To highlight some of  the major advantages of  the macro-based approach to 
long-run simulations we compare our simulation results with two simpler and more 
commonly used approaches to simulation of  both the yield curve and the equity 
market returns. These approaches do not incorporate the same inter-temporal 
structural relationships between equity returns and bond returns and macro vari-
ables that the macro model ‘enforces.’
One model which we can compare results with is a normal approximation to the 
LHS model dynamics, where we match the average annual return, volatility, and 
correlations of  two-, five-, ten-, and 30-year maturity points on the yield curves, 
as well as equity returns. A second model is a ‘bootstrap’ model, similar in that we 
match the average return and volatility to the structural model, but this instead 
samples historical quarterly data to also match the higher moments of  the empiri-
cal distribution that a normal approximation may be missing. The bootstrap gener-
ally produces fatter tails in equity returns, since they are non-normal on an annual 
basis. But for long-term investment horizons, the difference between the bootstrap 
and normal approximation is small.
The structure of  the LHS model serves to limit the plausible range of  outcomes 
over longer periods of  time. It induces mean reversion in excess bond and equity 
returns over time, which means that the long-run volatility of  real returns decreases 
with the investment horizon. For instance, following an increase in the equity risk 
premium, investors are ‘hit’ by an immediate capital loss, but they face higher 
returning investment opportunities afterwards. Similarly, a shock to interest rates 
causes negative bond returns in the short run, but investors then face an environ-
ment with higher yields subsequently. Figure 3.4 shows how the term structure of  
volatility is downward-sloping in our model, whereas it is flat in both the normal 
model and the bootstrap model.
The downward-sloping term structure of  volatility that the macro-based model 
generates means that there are very large differences between the long-term pre-
dictions of  the macro-based structural model and the two ‘naïve’ memoryless sim-
ulations of  returns. Over time the cumulative volatility of  returns explodes in both 
of  the non-structural, reduced-form approaches. This gives rise to exaggerated 
tail behaviors in these two simulation approaches. This can be seen in Figure 3.5, 
 Implications for Long-term Investors 41
which shows the distribution of  equity and bond returns from the three different 
models.
For example, both the normal and bootstrap processes give roughly 5 percent 
likelihoods of  negative annualized equity returns over a 20-year horizon. It is dif-
ficult to imagine such persistence in an economy without a fundamental structural 
shift in markets, given the implied long-term real capital decimation. Similarly, 
the 95th percentile of  20-year annualized compounded equity returns is nearly 
14 percent for both simple models. Here either growth or inflation would have to 
be materially higher for a sustained economic period than we have witnessed, or 
price–earnings ratios would eclipse historic levels. Similarly implausible relation-
ships would have to hold to generate bond return behavior as seen at the outer 
percentiles.
Importantly, the specific paths that generate the tail events in pure ‘engineering’ 
models, such as the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal distri-
bution model, of  asset price returns cannot be linked to a specific economic envi-
ronment or assumption. It is not possible to assess whether the ‘tail’ outcomes are 
reasonable from an economic standpoint as the fundamental economic parameters 
that shape the distribution of  returns are hidden from the visible eye. In the macro 
model, it is much easier to pinpoint the economic assumptions that have to be made 
to generate a given tail scenario, and hence to assess whether it is ‘plausible’ or not.
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Figure 3.4. Volatility term structure: equity returns.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Figure 3.5. Models’ distributions of  equity and bond returns.
Note: Panel A: Annualized horizon equity returns; Panel B: Annualized horizon bond returns; Panel 
C: Horizon annualized 60/40 returns.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Implications for Projections of DC and DB Plans
To get a sense of  the impact of  the three different return-generating processes in 
real-world settings, we construct two examples: one for a DC plan and another 
for a DB plan. The returns and yield curves generated by our models can then be 
used to assess the impact on key decision variables used by plan sponsors. While 
the annualized distributions of  return dynamics are informative, without the over-
lay of  the pension-specific models, key inferences may be missed. In addition, the 
long-term nature of  the pension saving/funding dynamic introduces a series of  
other effects due to the changing dynamics of  contributions. In the case of  the DC 
plan, the representative saver is increasing contributions though time as she ages 
and presumably has a higher income from which to save. For the DB plan, there is 
an endogenous, path-dependent relationship between contributions, asset returns, 
and changes in the discount rate that can be highly non-linear through time.
For our DC case, we look at the cumulative savings dynamics of  our return 
process over a 40-year glide path.6 With the passage of  the Pension Protection 
Act (PPA) in 2006 and its codification of  target date funds as Qualified Default 
Investment Alternatives (QDIAs), there has been explosive growth in these tar-
get date funds. According to Morningstar (Furman 2013),7 total target date fund 
assets reached $475 billion by November 2012—a four-fold increase since the pas-
sage of  the PPA. In practice each fund family has its own glide path, and most 
have individual nuances. Yet as a rule, the glide paths are invariably designed so 
that financial market risk in portfolios is decreasing in time-to-retirement. This is 
Panel C. Horizon annualized 60/40 returns. 
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Figure 3.5. (Continued)
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akin to the financial planning heuristic that one saving for retirement should hold 
(100 − age) in equities or other similarly risky assets. The essential motivation here 
is that as the DC plan participant is moving through his career toward retirement, 
he is replacing the present value of  future human capital with financial assets. In 
the early years, with many years to retirement, the reservoir of  this store of  human 
capital is large relative to financial assets and provides a buffer against market 
shocks. As the individual approaches retirement, the relative size of  the combined 
portfolio = PV(Human Capital) + Financial Savings, tilts toward an increasing 
fraction on the financial assets side. To maintain a relatively balanced risk position, 
the mix in the financial portfolio (here the target date fund) decreases in risk as one 
moves closer to retirement.
In practice, target date portfolios may have many different asset classes and gra-
dations within each asset class. MarketGlide calculates indices of  weighted-average 
glide paths from 37 fund families (see Abidi and Quayle 2010). For our purposes we 
use a simplified version of  the glide path that maps assets into cash, fixed income, 
and equities. This provides a relatively accurate representation of  key risks as the 
indices are dominated by U.S. aggregate fixed income and U.S. large cap equities. 
As a general rule, asset classes with distinct dynamics, principally commodities and 
real estate, comprise less than 2 percent each at any point along the industry aver-
age glide path. The glide path used is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6. Simplified market average DC glidepath.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Our hypothetical participant starts his participation in our DC plan with a sal-
ary of  $30,000 per year, which grows at a rate of  1 percent per year in excess of  
inflation.8 He contributes 6 percent of  pay and has a match of  4 percent from his 
employer. Moreover, he is assumed to invest solely in the target date fund corre-
sponding to the 40-year glide path.
The variables of  interest are the plan account balances at various points along 
his progression to retirement. Note that for each individual simulation, there will 
be some path-dependency as the values grow by the contributions as well as asset 
returns and the asset allocation is changing through time, so timing and order of  
specific return draws can be very important. Table 3.1 shows the characteristics of  
two hypothetical DB plans that we examine.
We assume both plans are currently 80 percent funded, approximately equal to 
the funding level (81.7 percent) estimated for the Milliman Pension Funding Index 
as of  January 31, 2013 (Milliman 2013). The funding rules for contributions are 
those as set out in the PPA.9 Unfunded amounts are subject to a seven-year amortiza-
tion basis. Each year the amount of  underfunding is compared to the rolled-forward 
amortization bases. If  the new underfunding exceeds the value of  the unamortized 
prior-year bases, a new basis is created with a seven-year amortization. Once a plan 
is fully funded, all existing bases are erased. The required contributions are the sum 
of  the amortization charges from these bases and the plan’s normal (service) cost.10 
For simplicity, we handled the plan’s current underfunding by assuming that equal 
amortization charges were established in the current and each of  the three prior 
years. Funding levels are a function of  both the plan’s assets and liabilities. In reality, 
plan sponsors have some latitude in the yield curve used to determine liabilities—
this is currently even more the case given the rules promulgated by MAP-21 in 2012. 
For our purposes we use an approach closer to the mark-to-market liability valuation 
as set forth by the FASB for accounting purposes and use a point-in-time yield curve 
rather than one that is a moving average through time.
Assets are rolled forward assuming asset returns per a 60/40 mix of  stocks and 
bonds rebalanced quarterly, less current year benefit payments. Liabilities are 
revalued each year given changes in the discounting yield curve. We examine two 
Table 3.1 Characteristics of  DB plans
Frozen plan Accruing plan
PV (liabilities) $1.25 billion $1.25 billion
0–10 years 42% 32%
10–20 years 35% 36%
20–30 years 16% 20%
30+ years 7% 12%
Duration of  liabilities 13.8 years 16.5 years
Normal cost (%) of  liabilities – 5%
Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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cases: a frozen plan and an open accruing plan. For the frozen plan, benefits are 
paid and the t+1 set of  cash flows becomes the current year’s benefit payments (we 
assume that the actuaries have perfect foresight into plan demographics). For the 
accruing plan, we make the simplifying assumption that normal cost is applied pro 
rata in future years. This yields a stationary distribution of  liabilities which, as a first 
order approximation, only shifts duration in response to changes in the yield curve.
The principal variable of  interest is the value of  required plan contributions. For 
the DB case, we expect scenario results to be highly path-dependent. Unlike the 
DC case where we had a time-varying asset allocation, here the path-dependency 
is a result of  the interplay between assets and liabilities (stocks and the yield curve) 
and the contribution rules. Strong equity markets and/or large increases in the 
discount rate can abruptly halt required contributions, and they may stay at zero 
for some time. Poor equity markets/flat-to-declining rates, combined with benefit 
outflows, can cause required contributions to increase and stay persistently high.
Results for DC Simulations
Results for our 40-year DC glide path are presented in Figure 3.7 and Table 
3.2. Over time, we see a pattern emerging. The spread of  the block bootstrap 
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Figure 3.7. Total savings in DC plan.
Source: Authors’ illustrations.
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distributions of  account balances is wider than the spread of  the multivariate nor-
mal distributions, which in turn is wider than those seen for the structural LHS 
model. A similar pattern is seen when we examine the means and medians of  the 
distribution as we go out to the far years of  the distribution. We might expect dif-
ferences in the width of  the distributions given the different generating processes, 
but one must recall that the models were calibrated to have the same mean and 
volatility of  returns for any single year. Hence, ex ante, most readers would probably 
expect the means and the medians of  the distributions to stay quite close for our 
entire horizon. But note that we are showing the means and medians of  the distri-
butions at each point in time, not the values corresponding to compounding the 
mean or median single-year returns.
The same forces that give rise to longer-run mean reversion in returns in the 
structural model affect the means and medians of  the distributions as well. For 
shorter horizons, these effects are small—even out to 20 years, values of  medians 
stay within 1 percent or less (means within 2 percent), but this drift compounds out 
to 40 years where there is as much as a 4 percent discrepancy in mean account bal-
ances in the difference between the bootstrap simulations and the structural model 
results.
Both tails of  the account balances are also quite different. After 20 years, the 
saver has combined employee and employer contributions of  just over $92,000. In 
both the bootstrap and normal models, he would expect that, almost 10 percent of  
the time, his account balance would be less than cumulative contributions. Under 
the LHS model, this would happen less than 3 percent of  the time. The LHS model 
produces downside accumulation results that are 26 percent better in the lowest 
percentile of  the distribution, and 23 percent better at the 5th percentile. On the 
flip side, the LHS approach also produces smaller account balances in the good 
scenarios. Balances are approximately 18–23 percent (26–27 percent) lower at the 
95th (99th) percentiles than in the bootstrap and normal distributions.
It is also instructive to look at the implied geometric average returns in the upper 
tails. For the normal and bootstrap cases, these are approximately 11 percent and 
13.3 percent. These do not seem too extreme when one considers that the aver-
age glide path weight in equity in the first 20 years is roughly 85 percent. Yet they 
may appear wider when viewed against the backdrop of  current bond yields of  less 
than 2 percent on ten-year Treasuries, and also given that higher equity returns 
have tended to coincide with periods of  persistently moderate or declining infla-
tion. A back-of-the-envelope calculation assuming he gets 2.5 percent from bonds 
over the period would imply either 10.0 percent or 12.7 percent excess returns for 
equities. This seems inordinately high for such a long period.
At the 40-year horizon, the bootstrap-driven model has the widest distribution, 
with both more negative and more positive outcomes. It should also be noted here 
that the asset allocation changes the most dramatically in the last 20 years of  the 
glide path. Equities drop from 78 percent with 20 years to go, to 44 percent at 
retirement. The bond allocation rises from 19 percent to 45 percent.
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The lack of  mean reversion in the bootstrap and normal models may be most dis-
tortionary here, since there is natural reason to expect negative serial correlation of  
returns over the medium to longer term in fixed income markets. If  a riskless bond, 
which is held to maturity, returns less than its yield to maturity it must be followed by 
returns greater than the initial yield to maturity. This mathematical fact is lessened 
somewhat if  we think about rolling portfolios and portfolios containing spread prod-
uct, but for the investment-grade fixed income assumed here, these factors would 
be insufficient to overcome the rationale for longer-term mean reversion in returns.
After 40 years, the account balances in the bootstrap simulations are on average 
1.5 percent higher than those for the normal simulations, and 3.5 percent higher 
than for the structural model. At the upper extremes of  the distributions (99th 
percentile) the bootstrap gives account balances nearly 40 percent greater than 
those in the normal model, and nearly 60 percent greater than those seen in the 
structural model. The implied annualized return is approximately 10.3 percent. 
Again this number seems inordinately large over a 40-year horizon, given the mix 
of  assets and our current starting point. In the bottom percentile, the bootstrap 
model lags the normal model by 16 percent and the structural model by 31 percent. 
The persistent negative returns required to get approximately 1.8 percent per annum 
seem implausibly low for a 40-year implied compounded average.
The spread for the normal model seems more reasonable by comparison, yet 
it also spans a range where the 99th percentile outcome is almost seven times that 
seen in the 1st percentile results. Its median and mean results are 1–2 percent 
higher than those seen in the structural simulation model. For the extreme percen-
tiles, the normal model is about 20–25 percent wider than the structural model. 
In the worst percentile case, we again see negative nominal returns over a 40-year 
horizon. Upside effective annual asset appreciations are 8.0 percent annualized at 
the 95th percentile (9.7 percent annualized for the 99th percentile). This does not 
seem terribly unreasonable given our horizon length and the fact that these are for 
the extremes of  the distribution.
The LHS model produces an annualized return of  0.8 percent in the worst per-
centile. This would be depressing, but much less so than for the other two models. 
Results to the upside are more muted as well producing effective annualized returns 
of  7.1 percent at the 95th percentile (and 8.4 percent for the 99th). It should be 
noted, however, that annualized returns can be a bit deceiving in this context when 
one thinks about the asset-weighted averages. Time-weighted, the averages have 
substantially more exposure to equities, but when viewed against the construct of  
the glide path and increasing reliance on bonds in the future, the average effective 
weight is likely more closely balanced.
Results for DB Plans
Turning our attention to the DB plans, we first analyze the behavior of  contribu-
tions across the three models for the frozen plan over a ten-year horizon. Recall that 
50 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
asset allocation is kept at 60 percent equity and 40 percent fixed income with quar-
terly rebalancing. Under the contribution rules, median minimum required contri-
butions drop to zero by 2017 (see Figure 3.8, Panel A). This is largely driven by the 
upward drift in the discount curve, assumed to increase by 100 basis points on average 
at the ten-year point of  the yield curve and somewhat more for short–intermediate 
maturities with the two-year rate rising by some 240 basis points. Average required 
contributions stay positive in all years given the funding rules. For the first three years, 
there is little difference across the models given the nature of  the amortization bases. 
Average contribution results differ a bit as we move forward in time, but even at their 
widest they amount to approximately $6 million in ten years’ time, or less than 1 per-
cent of  current liabilities. At the 99th percentile, the potential contributions display 
greater and widening variance. For 2014, the spread between the bootstrap and LHS 
models is a little over $9 million. In ten years’ time, this grows to $61 million.
Panel B in Figure 3.8 shows a distribution of  the present value of  contributions 
for the three models. Interestingly, all three models have average required contribu-
tions less than current shortfalls, given the central tendency for rates to rise. The 
present value of  average contributions ranges from a low of  $170 million in the 
LHS model to a high of  $210 million in the bootstrap model. The bootstrap and 
normal models display significantly higher distribution in the possible future con-
tributions. This difference is again largely attributable to the lack of  mean reversion 
of  returns in the bootstrap and normal distribution models and to the propensity 
for a greater left skew in the historic return distribution for equities.
Contribution requirements for the plan still accruing benefits are more inter-
esting (see Figure 3.9, Panel A). There is a similar pattern of  mean and median 
required contributions for the first few years, but then there is some divergence. 
Means and medians stay positive, as additional benefits are earned while the com-
bined increase in the yield curve and current asset levels are not sufficient to award 
‘free’ additional benefit accruals. Interestingly, the medians and means diverge 
most for the bootstrap simulations, with the bootstrap ultimately having the low-
est median contribution requirements, but the highest mean requirements. After 
the first few years, the bootstrap consistently produces the largest mean and 99th 
percentile contributions.
Over the next ten years, the average present value of  contributions for the open 
plan ranges from $789 million in the structural model to $866 million in the boot-
strap model. The normal model is in between, at $841 million. The bootstrap 
model also displays the widest variation in contributions and a substantial tail 
(Panel B, Figure 3.9).
Conclusion
This chapter examines three alternative methods to simulate long horizon yield 
curves and asset returns: a ‘block bootstrap’ simulation, a normal ‘Monte Carlo’ 
Panel A.  Minimum required contribution ($ millions): frozen plan. 
Panel B. Distribution of ten year cumulative contributions. 
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Figure 3.8. Contribution patterns under alternative scenarios: frozen plan.
Notes: Panel A: Minimum required contribution ($mm): frozen plan. Panel B: Distribution of  ten-year 
cumulative contributions. Panel C: Distribution of  five-year cumulative contributions.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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Figure 3.9. Contribution patterns under alternative scenarios: accruing plan.
Notes: Panel A. Minimum required contribution ($mm): accruing plan. Panel B. Distribution of  
ten-year cumulative contributions. Panel C. Distribution of  five-year cumulative contributions.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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simulation, and a structural economic regime-switching model. We explore how 
the choice of  modeling approach affects the simulated distribution of  future 
returns and outcomes (such as plan contributions and retirement wealth) for both 
DC and DB plans.
The bootstrap model has desirable properties for shorter simulations of  
a few years or less, but it produces very questionable results for long horizons. 
Examination on a path-by-path basis yields individual scenarios that strain cred-
ibility, both in individual variables and between variables. The normal model 
with independently, identically distributed returns also fails along several dimen-
sions. Over a longer horizon, fundamental tenants of  economic rationality dic-
tate bounds on valuations that would almost certainly rule out a true memoryless 
process, which the normal and bootstrap models assume. The weak linkages 
between variables that correlation provides are not sufficient to ensure reason-
able long-term relationships. A  simple correlation matrix cannot capture the 
complex dynamic relationship between stock returns, bond returns, and macro 
variables. These relationships are better characterized by a model that generates 
correlations which vary with the macroeconomic regime, such as our proposed 
macro-driven regime-switching model (LHS). This model captures many desir-
able properties at both the secular and cyclical frequencies and overcomes many 
of  the flaws of  simpler models. The model also makes it possible to directly link 
investment returns with simulated macroeconomic time series for inflation and 
GDP growth. For this reason we would argue that the structural model should 
be preferred for longer horizon simulations. The model can be used to evaluate 
different asset allocations, market or macro-contingent dynamic asset allocations, 
and hedging strategies.
A key implication of  the LHS model is mean reversion of  returns at longer 
investment horizons, which implies a downward-sloping term structure of  vola-
tility. This feature or idea is supported by the work of  Campbell and Viceira 
(2005) and by Siegel’s well-known work (1994) on long-run stock returns. We 
initially described the statistical uncertainty surrounding estimates of  risk pre-
miums and expected returns that may even vary over time. So, what is the equity 
risk premium we are supposed to be converging to in the simulation? The task 
ahead of  us is to incorporate some essence of  the uncertainty about the mean 
processes (risk premiums) into our long-term simulation models (see Pastor and 
Stambaugh 2012).
Our results and discussion should provide some cautionary lessons. 
Characterizing distributions of  outcomes ten or 40 years hence is an exercise 
that should be taken with more than a single grain of  salt. One should look 
at such models (no matter how sophisticated) only as one among a number of  
guides to answers, rather than the sole guide—or, worse yet, the answer in and 
of  itself.
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Appendix: The Regime-Switching Long Horizon 
Simulation Model
Regime Dynamics
The transition probabilities between regimes are a function of  the time spent in the 
regime. Formally, it is assumed that the transitions are governed by a Weibull distri-
bution. The survival function (the probability of  staying in a given regime past time 
t is given by S(t) = e t a
b( )/( )( ) , with associated probability density function f (t) = ba−btb−1
e t a
b( )/( )( ) , and hazard rate function h(t) = ( )/ ( )f t S t( ) ( )  = ba−btb−1. As discussed above, 
we calibrate the parameters to match the empirical mean and standard deviation 
of  the durations of  economic expansions and contractions.
Output Gap Dynamics
The output gap is assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process within 
regimes. In a regime-switching setting the key feature of  this specification is that 
changes in GDP growth are going to be more pronounced at the business cycle 
turning points.
dy y dt dty s y s y s r= − − + ⋅κ θ σ ε, , ,[ ]
Mechanically, the reason why the most dramatic changes occur around turn-
ing points is that it is typically at the business cycle turning points in the simulation 
(where the regime changes from one to the other) that the difference between the 
current output gap and the new ‘target level’ for the regime is the greatest. As a 
result, extreme levels of  GDP growth are going to be realized at the beginning of  
a recession (from positive to highly negative) and the beginning of  an expansion 
(from negative/zero to highly positive).
Inflation Dynamics
Inflation is assumed to have two components.
π π π= +cyclical persistent
d ydtcyclical cyclical s cyclical sπ κ σ δτ επ= − + ⋅, ,
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The first component is meant to capture excess ‘demand’-driven inflation. 
Its behavior is strongly linked to the output gap. It is in other words a short-term 
Phillips-type inflation vs. aggregate demand relationship.
d dt dtpersistent s persistent sπ κ π θ σ επ π π π= − − + ⋅( ), ,
The second component is a very low frequency/almost permanent component 
of  inflation. This component captures secular changes in inflation levels in the 
economy.
The Taylor Rule for Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a modified Taylor rule, such that the targeted 
short-term real rate responds to deviations of  inflation from its long-run level and 
the output gap.
r r y ylong y s long= +( ) + − − −* ( ) [ ],π β π π βπ
Monetary policy is neutral when the current inflation equals the current value 
for the time-varying long-term component of  inflation. This captures the notion 
that a substantial increase in long-run inflation expectations and average future 
realized inflation has to be a monetary phenomenon. On a path toward higher 
inflation, which would correspond to a shock in the permanent component of  
inflation, we would expect to see ‘unsustainable’ or overly accommodating levels of  
(low) short-term real rates of  interest. It is implausible for real policy rates to remain 
very high during inflationary periods. The general cyclical dynamics of  monetary 
policy in the model are however determined by the business cycle. In recessions the 
central bank cuts real rates, and in expansions the central bank tightens, increasing 
real short-term rates.
The Yield Curve Model
The nominal yield at maturity T is given by the average expected future short rate 
plus a nominal risk premium minus a nominal rate volatility convexity adjustment. 
The real yield for maturity T is given by the average expected future short real rates 
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plus a real risk premium (which may be negative) plus a liquidity risk premium–real 
rate volatility convexity adjustment. Mathematically, the nominal yield at time T 
can be written as
y E
T
rT
j
T
j T T T=





 + + −
=
∑1
1
δ θ γ
where r is the short rate (three-month T-Bill), δ  is the real rate risk premium for 
maturity T, θT  is the duration/inflation risk premium, and γT  is the convexity 
adjustment at maturity T. The real rate risk premium is driven by the business cycle 
in that we relate it to the output gap and is given by:
δ α βδ δT T T y= + +, , gap 
βδ ,T  is assumed to be positive, which captures the positive correlation between the 
real risk premium and the output gap. This captures the ‘flight-to-safety’ charac-
teristics of  U.S. securities in general and U.S. Treasuries in particular. The nominal 
duration (inflation) risk premium is given by:
θ α β πθ θT T T= + +, , inf 
Since βθ,T  is assumed to be positive, we generally expect a positive correlation 
between the inflation risk premium and the level of  inflation. The convexity adjust-
ments to the nominal and real yield curves are simply given by the conventional 
expression of:
γ σT T=
1
2
2 2
The convexity adjustment plays a significant role in shaping the longer-term 
maturities of  the yield curve, but does not in itself  affect the expected term 
premium.
Overall the dynamics of  the shorter end of  the curve (maturities inside five years) 
are heavily influenced by the business cycle and the expected federal funds rate.
The Equity Model
Equities are priced according to discounted dividend model with a terminal 
condition:
P E
D
r
E
r
P
t
t
t
t T= + +( )








+
+ +( )







=
∑
1
30
30
30
1
1
1λ λ
 Implications for Long-term Investors 57
The equity risk premium is assumed to follow a regime-switching process 
(Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process). Each regime is characterized by a mean, volatility, 
and mean reversion parameter.
Equity Risk Premium
The dynamics of  the equity risk premium are specified as an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck 
process that depends on the regime (contraction or expansion) that the economy is 
currently in. Formally,
d dt dterp s erp erp j erp s erp erpλ κ λ θ σ ε= − −  + ⋅, , ,
The parameters of  the model are calibrated to generate higher volatility in 
recessions and more violent changes in equity risk premiums around business cycle 
turning points.
This means that the parameters satisfy the following conditions: θcontraction,erp > 
θexpansion,erp, κcontraction,erp > κexpansion,erp, σcontraction,erp > σexpansion,erp. The first condition ensures 
that the P/E ratio will tend to decline when the economy goes into a recession. The 
second condition means that changes in P/E ratios are asymmetric in that they 
decline faster in recessions than they improve in expansions. The final condition 
gives more idiosyncratic volatility in the recession phase of  the business cycle. This 
is consistent with the skewness of  empirical equity returns where the left tail of  
equity returns is ‘fatter’ than the right tail and consistent with higher market volatil-
ity and uncertainty in recessions.
The Terminal Condition on Equity Valuations
In steady state the expected return on equity should equal the required rate of  
return on equity. We impose this condition to pin down the expected terminal val-
uation of  equities, beyond the 30-year forecasting horizon at each ‘node’ in the 
simulation.
P E rT T= +( ) / λ
The steady state condition can be derived as follows. The terminal expected 
price level is PT = dT / (r + λ−gD), where d is dividends, r is long-term interest rate, 
and roe is the return on equity. Now use the fact that d po e g po roeT T T D T= = −( ), 1 , 
and impose roe r= + λ  in equilibrium.
A Note on Expectations in the Model
The complicated regime-switching dynamics of  the model do not admit a 
closed-form solution for expected future fed funds rate, real GDP growth and 
inflation at any given ‘simulation node’ in the simulation. To deal with this issue, 
the expected future values of  a specific variable are set to model consistent linear 
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functions (projections) onto the most relevant current state variables in the model. 
The expected future fed funds rate at a given point in time in a given regime is for 
instance based on the linear projection of  future simulated realizations of  the fed 
funds rate, the current fed funds rate, the current level of  cyclical and persistent 
inflation, and the current output gap for a given set of  model parameters. To get a 
term structure of  expectations at a given point in time, the parameters for a given 
variable vary at different forecast horizons, which are one, two, three, four, five, 
seven, ten, 20, and 30 years. The expectations are in this way by construction ‘unbi-
ased,’ conditional on the current state of  the economy.
Notes
 1. In practice, most modern implementations would extend to a broader array of  asset 
classes (e.g. real estate, commodities, private equity, hedge funds, etc.). The reduced set 
of  asset classes is chosen to reduce complexity of  computation and to focus development 
of  intuition.
 2. Data are taken from Robert Shiller’s (2013) website for 1871–2010 and from Bloomberg 
(2013) thereafter.
 3. In nominal terms, the corresponding average ranges are ten-year rolling:  (1.7  per-
cent)–20.4  percent; 30-year rolling:  5.2  percent–13.6  percent; Full Sample 
Average: 8.7 percent. On a cumulative basis using Shiller’s CPI series, nearly 60 percent 
of  the cumulative inflation has occurred in the past 30 years.
 4. Discussed in Moore (2011).
 5. p is the probability if  in the high state to stay in that state, 1−p is the probability of  
transition to the low state. Symmetric results hold for q with respect to the low and 
high states.
 6. Schaus (2010) provides a thorough treatment of  the design and motivations behind DC 
glide paths.
 7. Furman (2013) cites sources at Morningstar in her January 13, 2013, New York Daily News 
article.
 8. For the Multivariate Normal and Bootstrap models inflation is assumed to be 3 percent 
over the period. For the Nested Structural model, inflation is a stochastic process which 
drives yield curve dynamics and feeds into equity valuations. Here the process is cali-
brated to a long-run mean of  3 percent.
 9. This analysis assumes zero funding balances (Prefunding Balance and Funding 
Standard Carryover Balance), which impacts the funding ratio and minimum required 
contribution.
 10. Provided the plan is underfunded or 100 percent funded. If  the plan is overfunded, the 
required contribution is Max (Normal Cost – Overfunding,0).
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